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What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt?  In this paper, we develop a model 
where myopic governments seek electoral popularity but can nevertheless commit 
credibly to service external debt. They do not default when they are poor because they 
would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default 
when they become rich because of the adverse consequences to the domestic financial 
sector. Interestingly, the more myopic a government, the greater the advantage it sees in 
borrowing, and therefore the less likely it will be to default (in contrast to models where 
sovereigns repay because they are concerned about their long term reputation).  More 
myopic governments are also likely to tax in a more distortionary way, and create more 
dependencies between the domestic financial sector and government debt that raise the 
costs of default. We use the model to explain recent experiences in sovereign debt 
markets.  
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Why do governments repay external sovereign borrowing? This is a question that has 
been central to discussions of sovereign debt capacity, yet the answer is still being 
debated.
2
 Models where countries service their external debt for fear of being excluded 
from capital markets for a sustained period (or some other form of harsh punishment such 
as trade sanctions or invasion) seem very persuasive, yet are at odds with the fact that 
defaulters seem to be able to return to borrowing in international capital markets after a 
short while.
3
 With sovereign debt in industrial countries at extremely high levels, 
understanding why sovereigns repay foreign creditors, and what their debt capacity might 
be, is an important concern for policy makers and investors around the world. This paper 
attempts to address these issues.  
 A number of recent papers offer a persuasive explanation of why rich industrial 
countries service their debt without being subject to coordinated punishment.
4
 As a 
country becomes more developed and moves to issuing debt in its own currency, more 
and more of the debt is held by domestic financial institutions, or is critical to facilitating 
domestic financial transactions because it is risk-free, interest bearing collateral. Default 
on domestic bond holdings now automatically hurts domestic activity by rendering 
domestic banks insolvent, or reducing activity in financial markets (see especially Bolton 
and Jeanne (2011) or Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2011)). If the government cannot 
default selectively on foreign holders of its debt only, either because it does not know 
who owns what, or it cannot track sales by foreigners to domestics (see Guembel and 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), Fernandez and Rosenthal 
(1990), Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), and Tomsz (2004). 
3 See, for example Eichengreen (1987), Sandleris, Gelos, and Sahay (2004), and Arellano (2009). Ozler 
(1993) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) find that increased premia on debt of past defaulters are too small 
to suggest strong incentives to pay.  
4 See, for example, Basu (2009), Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010), Bolton and Jeanne (2011), and, 
Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2011). 
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Sussman (2009) and Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010) for rationales), then it has a 
strong incentive to avoid default and make net debt repayments to all, including foreign 
holders of its debt. 
 What is less clear is why an emerging market or a poor country, that has a 
relatively underdeveloped financial sector, and hence little direct costs of default, would 
be willing to service its debt. Of course, one could appeal to reputation models where 
governments strive to maintain the long-term reputation of their country even though 
default is tempting. However, we are more realistic (or perhaps cynical). While there may 
be some such far-sighted governments, most governments care only about the short run, 
with horizons limited by elections or mortality – such short termism is perhaps most 
famously epitomized by Louis XV when he proclaimed “Apres moi, le deluge!”5 Short-
horizon governments are unlikely to see any merit in holding off default until their 
country becomes rich, solely because their reputation then will be higher – after all, the 
benefits of that reputation will be reaped only by future governments. 
 Short termism may, however, help in another way that explains why emerging 
markets or poor countries, with little cost of defaulting, still continue to service their debt. 
Short horizon governments do not care about a growing accumulation of debt that has to 
be serviced – they can pass it on to the successor government – but they do care about 
current cash flows. So long as cash inflows from new borrowing exceed old debt service, 
they are willing to continue servicing the debt because it provides net new resources. 
Default would only shut off the money spigot, as renegotiations drag on, for much of the 
duration of their remaining expected time in government. This may explain why some 
                                                 
5 After me, the flood. 
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governments continue servicing debt even though a debt restructuring may be so much 
more beneficial for the long-term growth of the country.  
 Thus we have a simple rationale for why developing countries may be able to 
borrow despite the absence of any visible mode of punishment other than a temporary 
suspension of lending; lenders anticipate the developing country will become rich, will be 
subject then to higher domestic costs of defaulting, and will eventually service its 
accumulated debt. In the meantime, the country’s short-horizon government is unlikely to 
be worried about debt accumulation, so long as lenders are willing to lend it enough to 
roll over its old debts plus a little more. Knowing this, creditors are willing to lend to it 
today. 
 Key in this narrative, and a central focus of our analysis, are the policies that a 
developing country government has to follow to convince creditors that it, and future 
governments, will not default.  To ensure that the country’s debt capacity grows, it has to 
raise the future government’s ability to pay (that is, ensure the future government has 
enough revenues) as well as raise its willingness to pay (that is, ensure the future 
penalties to default outweigh the benefits of not paying). The need to tap debt markets for 
current spending thus gives even the myopic government of a developing country a stake 
in increasing debt capacity. The policies that it follows will, however, potentially reduce 
the country’s growth as well as increase its exposure to risk.  
For instance, a higher tax rate will lead to lower real investment by the corporate 
sector, and therefore lower resources for a future government to tax, and a lower ability 
to pay. But it will also lead to more financial savings (because these typically escape the 
heavy taxes production is subject to), a larger holding of government bonds by domestic 
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entities, and thus a greater willingness of future governments to service their debt for fear 
of doing widespread damage to the economy through default. This way, short-horizon 
governments’ taxation decisions will be influenced significantly by their effect on debt 
capacity. 
In deciding whether to service its legacy debt or not, a myopic developing country 
government has to trade off the benefits from added resources if it decides to service the 
debt against the distortions from taxing the economy so as to preserve access to debt 
markets. We trace out the maximum debt that countries will be able to service.  
Interestingly, as the rate at which a government discounts the future falls (i.e., it 
becomes less myopic), its willingness to default on legacy debt increases. The long-
horizon government internalizes the future cost of paying back new borrowing, as well as 
the distortions that stem from tax policies required to expand debt capacity. This makes 
borrowing less attractive, and since for a developing country government the ability to 
borrow more is the only reason to service legacy debt, the long-horizon developing 
country government has more incentive to default (or less capacity to borrow in the first 
place). Similarly, developing countries with a more productive technology may also have 
lower debt capacity because the distortionary taxation needed to sustain access to debt 
markets will be more costly for such countries.
6
  
 Finally, we also allow the government to determine the degree to which the 
financial sector becomes dependent on government debt (thus exposing the country to 
greater costs when the government defaults, and setting in place a greater future 
                                                 
6
 Greater borrowing by developing countries need not be associated with better fundamentals. Studies show 
that correcting for the obvious factors, developing countries that are more dependent on external financing 
seem to grow relatively slower (see, for example, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007)), a puzzle that 
Aguiar and Amador (2009) suggest is explained by government borrowing). 
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willingness to pay).  We show that shorter horizon governments have a greater incentive 
to create more dependencies, in part because the future costs of default will not be borne 
by them, while the benefit of greater debt capacity will. To the extent that these 
dependencies emanate from the greater sophistication of the financial sector, a short-
horizon government has an incentive to create financial market institutions (such as repo 
markets) or liberalize the financial sector, in order to expand its own borrowing capacity. 
It may, however, do this to excess. We offer some examples in the paper. 
It is useful to compare our model to the implications of existing models of 
external sovereign debt. In many of these models (see, for example, Eaton and Gersowitz 
(1981)), the cost of defaulting on foreign debt, either in terms of sanctions, exclusion 
from financial markets, or costs of higher future risk premia, have to be very high to 
outweigh the benefit of not repaying the enormous stock of debt. Hence, for example, 
“trigger” strategy models require punishment for a large number of periods if the 
borrower defaults. In our paper, though, the assumption of short government horizon 
ensures that the government emerging from poverty never internalizes the cost of 
repaying the entire stock of debt (or equivalently, the benefit from defaulting on it). All it 
cares about is whether the expected cash inflows from retaining access to the external 
debt market is positive over the remaining term of the government. If it is, the 
government will continue servicing debt, even if the only cost of default is the disruption 
of credit markets for a short while.
7
  
 
                                                 
7
 Indeed, that developing country governments myopically service their debts too long is consistent with 
the findings in Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2006) that growth starts picking up in countries almost 
immediately after they default, while output declines steadily before. Of course, another explanation is the 
equilibrium one that only countries that benefit from default do so.  
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Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) show that the reputational arguments for repayment 
break down because by defaulting and using asset markets to self-insure when net 
repayments have to be made, a country can guarantee itself higher consumption if it 
defaults than in if it does not.  Anticipation of such default should preclude a country 
from borrowing in the first place.  In a sense, our developing country government is a 
special case of Bulow-Rogoff, but our model clarifies that borrowing need not be 
impossible so long as future governments have the ability and willingness to pay too.  
This implies, however, a feasible time profile of repayments that cannot be exceeded.  
More generally, because the costs of default are sizeable in our model only when 
the country becomes rich, the nature of developing country defaults and rich country 
defaults are likely to be very different. Developing countries are more likely to default 
when revenue shortfalls (crop failures or a fall in export prices) or increases in 
expenditure (natural disaster or a rise in import prices) lead to a buildup in debt that can 
imply net debt outflows for some time. The reason for default is not that the country 
cannot pay but that the time path of prospective payments does not make it worthwhile 
for the current government to maintain access to debt markets. For rich countries, though, 
the direct cost of default is substantial, and default looms only when the country simply 
does not have the political and economic ability to raise the revenues needed to repay 
debt.      
Our model implies the sustainable level of debt for developing countries is likely 
significantly lower (see, for example, the evidence in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a)), and 
that defaults could be cured with some re-profiling of the debt. However, it also implies 
that when rich countries are in danger of default, multilateral agencies like the IMF that 
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lend them more without helping these countries expand productivity and growth are only 
postponing the inevitable messy restructuring.  Finally, the observation that rich country 
defaults are more likely to be solvency defaults than liquidity defaults has implications 
for the current sovereign debt situation in Europe that we discuss later in the paper.  
 The rest of the paper is as follows. In section I, we present the simple model and 
analyze it in section II. We compare the short-horizon government’s choices to those of a 
long-horizon government in section III. In section IV, we examine the effects of 
endogenizing the degree of dependence of the financial market on government debt. In 
section V, we discuss implications, in section VI the related literature, and then conclude.  
All proofs are in Appendix A and details of the numerical example are in Appendix B. 
I. The model 
 
 Consider a world with three dates (t = 0, 1, 2) and two periods. The country that 
we focus on is emerging from poverty at date 0, with a pre-existing debt of amount D0  (it 
does not really matter whether this is private debt or government debt – it will have to be 
repaid by taxing the private sector).  We assume this is entirely foreign borrowing, and is 
repayable to foreigners at end of the first period. Households and companies (collectively 
known as the private sector) have an endowment of 0E . 
 The private sector has access to a production technology which, in return for an 
investment  1k  during period 1, produces a return in the short run (end of period 1) of  
1 1( )f k as well as in the long run (end of period 2) of 2 1( )f k , with 0, 0f f    .  The 
remaining resources, 0 1E k , represent financial savings which are invested in 
government bond markets or in the global capital markets. We assume universal risk-
neutrality and a time preference rate of r, which is thus the cost of borrowing in domestic 
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as well as foreign debt markets. The private sector has a slight home bias, so if expected 
returns between the domestic market and foreign markets are equal, it prefers investing in 
the domestic market.  
The government of the country is run by short-horizon politicians each period 
who want to maximize spending on populist schemes over the period, but do not consider 
the effects of their actions over the long term. Such myopic behavior could be explained 
by an inordinate desire to get re-elected (without considering the problems of governance 
if they are successful). Such spending could also be induced in a  “rat race equilibrium”  
(see Holmstrom (1999)) where there is short-run opacity about true economic outcomes – 
if sustainable jobs are harder to create, the politician may spend on make-work jobs so 
long as the public has a hard time distinguishing the two in the short run. Everyone 
knows the politician creates such jobs, and it is inefficient, but if he does less than the 
equilibrium amount, he will get punished for being ineffective.   Clearly, extreme myopia 
is a caricature, and is only to make the effects of the model clear. Later, we will see what 
longer horizons might do, as well as consider the effects of more realistic objective 
functions. 
The government can raise money for spending in two ways. First, it can levy taxes 
on the private sector of up to Maxt every period on the cash flows generated from real 
investment – we assume this reflects the political and economic capacity of the 
government to collect tax revenues. We assume financial investments by the private 
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sector are not taxed.
8
  A second way the government can raise more money is through 
additional debt issues.  
The government can either default on its existing debt at the beginning of the 
period or decide to pay it back. If it defaults on its debt, the debt is written off but credit 
markets are disrupted and the country cannot borrow again until next period when it will 
be ruled by the next government. If the first period government does not default, it can 
borrow an amount D1 that is payable at date 2 by the second period government. The first 
period government uses the proceeds of the new debt issued, as well as the taxes raised, 
to make committed debt repayments as well as to fund its spending.    
We assume new debt 1D  is in the form of own-currency bearer bonds. Because 
the second period government cannot tell domestic investors from foreign investors, it 
cannot default selectively. Let the amount foreign investors buy be denoted as 1
ForD and 
the amount domestic investors buy be 1
DomD  with 1 1 1
For DomD D D  . We assume that 
there is no cost of defaulting on government debt held by foreigners, other than that of 
disrupting the credit markets and postponing any new borrowing to next period. There is, 
however, a cost to the second period government of defaulting on domestically held 
government debt which, in reduced form, results in the government spending 
z 1 (1 )
DomD r less on populist measures, where z > 1.  
The deadweight cost of default z reflects the centrality of low risk government 
bonds to the functioning of the domestic financial sector in a rich country. Rich country 
financial systems are typically more arm’s length and market based, with the credit 
                                                 
8  Equivalently, there is a uniform income tax, and the government levies an additional set of taxes such as 
payroll taxes or excise duties on real investment projects. Financial investments are typically subject to 
lower taxation, partly because of their greater mobility in a country with an open capital account. 
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worthiness of financial sector participants of critical importance in supporting the high 
transaction volume. Any hint that any of the players could be impaired as a result of 
losses on their holdings of government assets could lead to questions about their 
creditworthiness, and a dramatic fall in financial activity and hence economic output (see, 
for example, Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2011)). For any given size of government 
bonds held by the financial sector, the cost of government default could be higher in rich 
countries because more transactions are disrupted.  Another channel could be that 
government bonds are collateral (see Bolton and Jeanne (2011)) for many transactions 
where even the slight hint of default risks could make transaction costs prohibitive. 
Again, many more such transactions are likely to take place in a rich country’s financial 
system.  
Of course, a plausible argument could be made for z being higher in 
underdeveloped, repressed financial sectors, where financial institutions may be forced to 
hold disproportionate amounts of government debt because few other buyers can be 
found. In our framework, though, borders are open, so enforcement mechanisms have to 
be very sophisticated for repression to be effective. This would again suggest z, if 
anything, is higher in more sophisticated financial systems where repressive regulations 
can be enforced. 
We will allow the deadweight cost z to be endogenously determined later in the 
paper. It may be pushed higher if the government opens new markets for collateralized 
borrowing, or if the government mandates a higher liquidity holding of government 
bonds by domestic banks. The timeline of the model is in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Model timeline 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Period 1                   Period 2 
t=0       t=1         
  
      t=1
+           
t=2 
            
(1) Existing 
foreign debt 
D0 and 
corporate 
endowment 
E0. 
 
(2) Govt 
decides 
whether to 
announce 
“default” on 
legacy debt;  
It announces 
tax rate t1; 
Corporate 
sector makes 
investment 
k1 and saves 
the rest (E0- 
k1) 
 
(3) Short 
run 
corporate 
output f1(k1) 
realized;  
 
 
(4) Govt 
collects taxes  
t1 f1(k1); 
Govt repays 
debt of  
D0 (1+r) and 
raises new 
debt (if no 
default): 
Externally 
financed debt 
is 1
ForD , 
domestically 
financed 
debt 1
DomD .  
 
(5) New govt 
comes in;  
Govt decides 
whether to 
announce 
“default” on 
legacy debt; 
announces 
tax rate t2; 
 
(6) Long run 
corporate 
output f2(k1) 
realized; Govt 
collects taxes  
t2 f2(k1); 
Govt repays 
debt of  
D1 (1+r)  
(if no default) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Solving for Debt and Default 
Since date 2 is the last period, the second-period government cannot borrow, and will 
repay existing debt if the cost of default exceeds the funds repaid, that is if,  
 1 1(1 ) (1 ).
DomD r zD r    (1) 
 
This represents the country’s willingness to pay.  Since 1 1 1
For DomD D D  , the 
willingness-to-pay constraint can also be expressed as a constraint on the foreign 
borrowing of the first-period government 1 1( 1)
For DomD z D  , which is why we require z 
to be greater than 1. 
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Furthermore, at date 2, the second-period government will raise taxes to the 
maximum possible so that 2
Maxt t .  The government therefore has the ability to pay its 
debt if   
 1 2 1(1 ) ( ).
MaxD r t f k   (2) 
 
(1) and (2) are the key constraints in determining future debt capacity. Now let us fold 
back to date 1 when the first period government has to choose whether to default or not 
on initial debt 0D , the tax rate 1t , and the amount of debt it will borrow, 1D , if it has not 
defaulted.  
2.1. Corporate Investment and First Period Government’s Maximization Problem 
Start first with the private sector’s investment incentives. Corporations maximize 
the present value of their post-tax cash flows net of the cost of investment, discounted at 
the opportunity rate from lending in the bond market: 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 12
1 1
max (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) .
(1 ) (1 )
k t f k t f k k
r r
   
 
 (3) 
 
Clearly 1 0k E  for external borrowing to be feasible (external borrowing is infeasible if 
there is no domestically-held government debt going into the last date, and a positive 
level of domestically-held government debt requires domestic private sector financial 
savings, so 1 0k E ). Assume the inequality holds.  Then, the first-order condition for 
corporate investment satisfies 
 1 1 1 2 2 12
1 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 1 0.
(1 ) (1 )
t f k t f k
r r
     
 
 (4) 
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We denote the solution to (4) as *1 1 2( , )k t t . Corporate investment 
*
1 1 2( , )k t t obviously 
decreases in the level of tax rates t1 and t2.  Since 2
Maxt t throughout, in what follows we 
adopt the simpler notation *1 1( )k t . 
 Now consider the myopic government’s objective of maximizing spending. If it 
does not intend to default, it will solve  
 
1 1
*
1 0 1 1 1 1,
max (1 ) ( ( ))
D t
D D r t f k t    (5) 
 
subject to constraints (1) and (2). 
If the government does intend to default on its debt, it expects to be shut out from 
the debt market and will maximize  
1
*
1 1 1 1max ( ( ))t t f k t       (6) 
 We first assume no default, then the case with default, and compare the two to 
determine the default decision. 
2.2. No default by first-period government 
 Clearly, assuming they do not expect default, government debt bought by 
domestic investors in the first period will equal domestic private savings (given their mild 
home bias, they do not invest abroad if expected returns are equalized), so 
1 0 1( )
DomD E k  .9 Substituting into the willingness-to-pay constraint, we get 
*
1 0 1 1( ( )).D z E k t   
 Now, consider the government’s decision.  Since the government derives benefits 
from spending, it wishes to borrow as much as possible until one of the two constraints 
                                                 
9 We assume that the transition from poverty to middle income is defined by the condition 0 1E k so 
financial savings of the private sector are positive. 
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binds. Depending upon which constraint binds first, the remaining part of the program – 
choosing the tax rate – can be analyzed separately under each constraint. Before we 
analyze each case separately, we consider which constraint – ability to pay or willingness 
to pay – binds and when. 
Constrained by ability to pay or willingness to pay? 
As the first-period tax rate ( 1t ) is varied, the ability-to-pay constraint binds before 
willingness-to-pay constraint if and only if  
 * *2 2 1 1 0 1 1
1
( ( )) ( ( )).
(1 )
t f k t z E k t
r
 

 (7) 
 
Given that *k decreases in 1t , we have 
 
Lemma 1: There exists a level of corporate tax rate in the first period, 
1t , such that only  
the ability-to-pay constraint binds if 1 1t t and only the willingness-to-pay constraint 
binds if 1 1t t .  The threshold level 1t is decreasing in the starting endowment E0 and 
deadweight cost of default z. 
The intuition is straightforward.  As the corporate tax rate rises, investment falls, 
reducing the next government’s tax proceeds.  Simultaneously, domestic savings 
increase, allowing government domestic borrowing to increase, increasing the 
deadweight costs suffered by next government from defaulting on sovereign debt, and 
increasing the willingness to pay.  Thus, at high corporate tax rates, it is the ability-to-pay 
constraint that binds.  Conversely, at low tax rates, the willingness-to-pay constraint 
binds.    
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Binding Ability To Pay  
When the binding constraint is the ability to pay, the first-period government’s 
maximization problem is given by 
 
1
* *
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
max ( ( )) ( ( )).
(1 )
t t f k t t f k t
r


 (8) 
 
Effectively, the current government chooses the tax rate to maximize the proceeds of 
taxes in both periods since it can borrow against next period’s tax proceeds by taking on 
debt and passing on the burden of repayment to the next government.  The optimal tax, 
1
At , satisfies the first-order condition:
 10
 
 
*
* * *1
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
(1 )
dk
t f k t f k f k
r dt
     
 
 (9) 
 
Note that 
*
1
1
dk
dt
< 0 so that at low tax rates, proceeds increase in tax rate (the direct effect 
of a higher marginal tax rate), but if the tax rate becomes very large, the indirect effects 
as it reduces corporate investment dominate – the standard Laffer Curve effect.  With 
standard concavity of the optimization problem we have 
Lemma 2: In the region where only the ability-to-pay constraint binds, the first-period 
government’s optimal tax rate is given by 1
At , which solves (9), and is unaffected by the 
starting endowment E0 and deadweight cost of default z.  
 
                                                 
10 A sufficient condition to ensure the second-order condition is negative is that 
2 *
1
2
1
0
d k
dt
 . Using 
condition (4), this is always met when 
''' '''
1 20, 0f f  . 
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Next, we consider the solution when the willingness to pay is the binding constraint. 
Optimal Taxes and Borrowing in the Willingness-to-pay Region 
In this case, the first-period government’s problem is  
 
1
* *
1 1 1 1 0 1 1max ( ( )) ( ( ))t t f k t z E k t   (10) 
 
Now, the government’s tax rate choice becomes interesting.  It can no longer borrow 
fully against next government’s tax revenues as the next government is constrained by its 
willingness to repay public debt.  On the one hand, the current government may want to 
lower the tax rate to induce the corporate sector to invest more, thus allowing the taxable 
revenues to increase. This is the standard incentive effect of lower taxes. On the other 
hand, lowering the corporate tax rate shrinks the financial savings in the economy, 
shrinking the domestic appetite for government debt, reducing the next government’s 
willingness to pay, and in turn the current government’s ability to borrow. Put differently, 
the short-horizon government may want to “crowd out” private real investment (and 
economic growth) in an attempt to increase its short-term borrowing and spending 
capacity.   
 The optimal tax rate trades off these two effects.  We denote the solution to this 
program as 1
Wt and it satisfies the first-order condition:
 11
 
 
*
' * *1
1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) 0.
dk
z t f k f k
dt
       (11) 
 
                                                 
11 Again, a sufficient condition to ensure the second-order condition is negative is that 
2 *
1
2
1
0
d k
dt
  which is 
always met when 
''' '''
1 20, 0f f  . 
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Lemma 3: In the region where only the willingness-to-pay constraint binds, the first-
period government’s optimal tax rate 1
Wt satisfies (11), and is not affected by the starting 
endowment 0E , but is increasing in deadweight cost of default z.  
 
Optimal Taxes and New Borrowing 
Comparing the first-order condition in the willingness-to-pay region (11) with that in the 
ability-to-pay region (9), it follows that 1
Wt > 1
At . Combining the analysis, we have: 
Proposition 1: Conditional on not defaulting, the first-period government chooses a tax 
rate *1t where (i) 
*
1 1
At t , if 1 1 1
W At t t  ; (ii) *1 1t t , if 1 1 1
W At t t  ; and, (iii) *1 1
Wt t  
otherwise. Further, new government borrowing *1D is given by the condition: 
  * * * * *1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1
1
min ( ( )), ( ) ,
(1 )
D t f k t z E k t
r
 
  
 
 (12) 
 
where * *1 1( )k t satisfies (4) for 
*
1 1t t  and 2
Maxt t . 
   
To understand the solution better, let us consider how it varies as we change the starting 
endowment E0 and the sophistication of the financial sector z, which determines the 
deadweight cost of default. As Lemma 1 indicates, the threshold level 1t is decreasing in 
the starting endowment as well as the sophistication of the financial sector. We can show  
Corollary 1: If the starting endowment E0 is sufficiently low, that is, below some 
threshold level 0E , then the economy is in the willingness-to-pay region, 1 1 1
W At t t  and 
as E0 increases, neither the tax rate 
*
1t nor investment 
* *
1 1( )k t increase. Government 
borrowing *1D , however, increases. As E0 increases above the threshold 0E but is below a 
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higher threshold 
0E , 1 1 1
W At t t  ,and  both constraints bind. The tax rate *1t  now falls as 
E0 increases, and government borrowing continues to increase. Finally, when 0 0E E , 
the economy is in the ability-to-pay region, with 1 1 1
W At t t  . In this region again, as 
endowment E0 increases, the tax rate 
*
1t ,  investment 
* *
1 1( )k t , and government 
borrowing *1D all remain unaffected. 
 
Consider a simple example that allows us to illustrate Proposition 1 and Corollary 
1.  Let 1 2( ) , ( ) (1 ) ,f k k f k k
      where (0,1), 0, (0,1).     12 Let 
00.75, 3, 0.66, 0.6, 0.05, 1.0, 1.1.
Maxt r E z          
As Figure 2 suggests, optimal tax rates (assuming no default for now), given by 
*
1t , decrease in the endowment for intermediate values of the endowment (when both 
constraints bind simultaneously); Additional endowments increase willingness to pay, so 
tax rates have to fall for the economy’s ability to pay to keep pace. However, the 
relationship is flat both for very high and very low levels of endowment. This is because 
the optimal tax when only one of the constraints binds is independent of endowments.
13
  
As Figure 3 suggests, new government borrowing *1D increases for low and 
moderate levels of endowment when the binding constraint is the ability to pay, and the 
marginal addition to endowment goes into the domestic debt market, thus expanding debt 
capacity. However, there is no effect on debt at high levels of endowment – for countries 
                                                 
12 Closed form expressions for the example are in the appendix B. 
13 Note that at very low levels of endowment, the unconstrained optimal tax rate 1
Wt exceeds Maxt so that 
*
1t is truncated at 
Maxt . 
19 
 
with large endowments, debt is capped by their ability to pay, which is not affected at the 
margin by the additional endowments going into the domestic debt market.  
In Figures 4 and 5, instead of varying endowment, we vary the productivity 
parameter . At low productivity levels, the economy’s ability to pay is the constraint, 
whereas at high productivity levels, its willingness to pay is the constraint. In the region 
where both bind, the optimal tax increases in productivity – higher productivity means 
more goes to real investment, which means higher taxes are needed for funds to flow to 
the financial sector.  
Less intuitive is that *1D  is non-monotone in productivity (see Figure 5), rising 
initially and falling eventually. That new government borrowing rises with productivity 
in the ability-to-pay region is natural given that the more productive private sector will 
produce greater cash flows in the future, which alleviates the constraint. In the 
willingness-to-pay region, however, the short-horizon government has to tax harshly so 
as to boost domestic financial savings. When productivity is high, the required tax rate to 
maintain a commensurate willingness to pay can be substantial, and debt capacity *1D  can 
fall with productivity.    
We can also characterize what happens as the parameter z representing the 
deadweight cost of default varies.   
Corollary 2: If the deadweight cost  parameter z is sufficiently low, that is, below some 
threshold level z , then the economy is in the willingness-to-pay region and as z increases, 
government borrowing *1D and the tax rate 
*
1t increase, whereas investment 
* *
1 1( )k t decreases. As z increases above the threshold z but is below a higher threshold z , 
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1 1 1
W At t t  ,and  both constraints bind.  The tax rate *1t  now falls as z  increases, and 
government borrowing continues to increase. Finally, if z increases over the threshold z ,    
then the economy is in the ability-to-pay region. In this region, as z increases, 
government borrowing *1D , the tax rate 
*
1t  and investment  
* *
1 1( )k t remain constant.   
 
Interestingly, the relationship between the deadweight cost parameter and the tax 
rate is non-monotonic, reflecting the effects of differing binding constraints. In particular, 
in the region where the willingness to pay binds, an increase in z increases the ability of 
the government to borrow the amounts that go into financial savings, giving it a greater 
incentive to tax real corporate investment. This could be thought of as a form of 
“economic repression”.  
The remaining step is to analyze when the first-period government chooses to 
default versus repaying the legacy debt. We turn to that now. 
2.3. No-default level of legacy debt 
In case the government chooses to default, it is shut out from the debt markets.  Its total 
resources available for spending come only from tax collection but it is free from 
repaying the debt of the past.  Therefore, conditional on default, it chooses 1t  to solve 
 
1
*
1 1 1 1max ( ( )).t t f k t  (13) 
 
The solution to this problem is denoted as **1t and it satisfies the first-order condition: 
 
*
' * *1
1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) 0.
dk
t f k f k
dt
   (14) 
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Note the tax rate conditional on an intent to default is in between the low tax rate when 
the government wants to enhance the future government’s ability to pay debt, and the 
higher tax rate if it wants to enhance the future government’s willingness to pay debt.  
The first-period government defaults if and only if  
 
 ** * ** * * * *1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1( ( ) (1 ) ( ( )).t f k t D D r t f k t     (15) 
 
Thus, we obtain: 
 
Proposition 2: There is a threshold level of date-0 (legacy) debt 0
MaxD  such that the first-
period government defaults on this debt if and only if 0 0 ,
MaxD D where 0
MaxD is the value 
of 0D  that equates both sides of  (15), and where in turn 
*
1D and
*
1t are as described in 
Proposition 1, **1t satisfies (14), and 
*
1 1( )k t solves (4).  The no-default level of legacy debt 
0
MaxD is increasing in the initial endowment E0 and the deadweight cost of default, z.  
 
In other words, we obtain the natural result that short-horizon governments are 
more likely to default following an adverse endowment shock, which reduces the  
willingness to pay of successor governments, and hence the ability to borrow today. 
Similarly, they are also more likely to default if the likely damage to the domestic 
financial sector from a future default is smaller, constraining their ability to borrow 
today. 
We plot 0
MaxD for different values of endowment in Figure 3 and for different 
values of productivity in Figure 5.  0
MaxD is always weakly below *1D , suggesting the 
government finds deviations from the short-term revenue-maximizing tax rate to enhance 
debt capacity worthwhile only if it produces a net inflow from the debt markets. 0
MaxD is 
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equal to *1D only when parameters are such that the government selects the short-term 
revenue-maximizing tax rate even when it is trying to maximize *
1D . Finally, as with debt 
capacity *1D , the default point 0
MaxD is also increasing in endowments but non-monotone 
(first increasing and then decreasing) in private sector’s productivity.  We also plot the 
tax rate **1t that the short-term government charges if it defaults on legacy debt.  This tax 
rate is invariant in endowment (Figure 2) and productivity (Figure 4), and lies in between 
the tax rates charged absent default at the extreme values of endowment and productivity. 
 
III. Debt and Default with a Long Horizon Government 
Let us now compare the short-horizon government’s decision to default with that 
of a long-horizon government, which cares about spending in both periods.  Interestingly, 
a long-horizon government would default more, that is, over a greater parameter range 
than a short-horizon government. The reason is that the myopic government does not 
internalize the cost of the future repayment of current borrowing, and in the willingness-
to-pay region, also the distortion caused by current taxation (which tries to maximize 
current resources including borrowing) on future output and tax revenues. The long-
horizon government internalizes these costs and therefore does not find borrowing to 
repay old debt as attractive. It is more willing to default on legacy debt so as to restore 
economy’s long-run growth prospects. 
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3.1. Variable Horizon 
Formally, suppose the government discounts the future using factor β ∈ [0,
1
1 r
]. 
When β=0, we have our short-horizon government, while when β=
1
1 r
, we have a long-
horizon government which has the same rate of time preference as the market. In 
between, we have differing degrees of myopia. The government’s objective function if it 
borrows to repay existing debt and spends the rest, is given by  
      1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )D D r D r t f k t t f k t        (16) 
 
By inspection, if 
1
(1 )r
 

, then a long-horizon government sees no benefit in bringing 
forward spending by borrowing, since that cuts into future spending. So it gets no benefit 
from having continued access to debt markets. As a result, it does not want to repay the 
legacy debt, and will always default. Now let us turn to see what happens at lower levels 
of β. We will show that the amount of legacy debt it is willing to service falls in β. 
 When the government’s borrowing is constrained by its ability to pay, it can 
borrow up to second period revenues, so 2 21
1
t f
D
r


. Substituting in (16), the 
government’s maximization simplifies to (8), which is just the short-horizon 
government’s problem. So , 0 , 01 1
A At t   .  This should not be surprising because, as we 
noted earlier, the ability to borrow in the debt markets effectively lengthens the short-
horizon government’s horizon, and makes it fully internalize long-term revenue when 
ability to pay is the constraint.   
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 However, the government’s objective function when only the willingness to pay 
constraint binds is not the same as that of the short-horizon government. In that 
region, *1 0 1 1( ( ))D z E k t  . Substituting in (16) and differentiating w.r.t. 1t , we get   
 
*
' * * *1
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0.
dk
z t f k z r t f k f k
dt
        
 
 (17) 
 
Comparing with (11), we see that  , 0 , 01 1
W Wt t   . Moreover, differentiating w.r.t. β and 
using the envelope theorem, we see that 
, 0
1 0
Wd t
d



 ; As the government cares more 
about the future, the tax rate it sets in the willingness-to-pay region falls. This is because 
it internalizes to a greater extent the distortions stemming from the higher tax rate needed 
to move resources into the financial sector so as to ensure greater willingness to pay for 
future governments. Note also that 
1t , which is the tax rate demarcating the boundary 
between the willingness to pay region and the ability to pay region,  does not vary with β. 
This means that as  rises, the government moves from not being constrained by the 
willingness to pay to being constrained by the willingness to pay. 
 Finally, if the government decides to default, it sets 1t  to maximize 
    1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) .G t f k t t f k t   (18) 
 Let **1t be the solution. Then the government will not default iff  
** * * *
1 1 0 1 1( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )G t D D r D r G t      where 
*
1D  is the maximum amount of debt it 
can borrow at date 1. This means the maximal legacy debt that will be repaid is 
 * * **0 1 1 1
1
(1 (1 )) ( ) ( )
(1 )
MaxD D r G t G t
r
      
 (19) 
 Differentiating w.r.t. β, we get after some algebra: 
25 
 
Proposition 3: As the government’s discount factor   increases, the maximum legacy 
debt 0
MaxD it is willing to repay falls. When
1
1 r
 

, the government is not willing to 
repay any legacy debt, that is, 0 0
MaxD  . 
  
Therefore lengthening horizons reduces the attractiveness of repaying legacy debt 
at date 0. The sole benefit to repayment is the ability to borrow again. But with longer 
horizons, new borrowing is less attractive because, first, the government internalizes to a 
greater extent the future costs of repaying new debt, and, second, the maximum amount 
of new debt it is willing to raise is also lower because the government internalizes the 
costs to future revenues from setting the higher tax rate today that is needed to signal its 
willingness to pay.  Therefore, by making future borrowing less attractive, and therefore 
default more attractive, longer horizons reduce the first period government’s debt 
capacity (and of governments before it).  By contrast, a short-horizon government will 
not default because it values the benefits from immediate expenditures while disregarding 
the costs of new borrowing and lower future revenues, which largely fall on future 
governments.   
Figures 6a and 6b illustrate for the parameters in our example how tax policy and 
debt capacity behave as a function of   , the inverse of government myopia, as 
endowment is varied.  Figures 7a and 7b repeat the exercise as private sector’s 
productivity is varied.  As  rises, the government becomes more long-horizon in its 
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decision-making. Its optimal tax rate given no default falls (so does its borrowing *1D  in 
this case) and the maximum amount of legacy debt it will pay, 
0
MaxD , falls as well.
14
  
3.2. Valuable Government Spending and the Benefits of Short Horizons 
Note that without any economic role for government spending, even the long-
horizon government’s taxation policy is suboptimal relative to the first-best, which is 
simply to have no taxes whatsoever.  This, however, is again just for simplicity and our 
qualitative comparisons would hold even if we added a multiplier on government 
spending. Specifically, suppose government spending yields value that is m times the 
spending.  Then, the objective function of the government (no matter of what type) does 
not change since all spending is multiplied by m. However, when m is greater than one 
but not too large, some government spending is efficient, and its level is obtained by 
equating the marginal return of private sector’s capital investment to the multiplier on 
government spending.
15
  
If some government spending is efficient, then a government could benefit its 
country by generating some additional debt capacity. Note that a short horizon 
government can generate more debt capacity than a long horizon government, simply 
because the former does not internalize the cost of repaying the debt, and therefore can 
commit to servicing it. Somewhat paradoxically then, the long horizon government may 
be unable to undertake valuable ex-ante spending precisely because its concerns about the 
                                                 
14 Note that two of the cases, 0,0.25  correspond to identical outcomes in Figures 6a and 7a. 
15 When the multiplier is sufficiently large, it may be first-best efficient to have all spending be done by the 
government rather than some real investments being made by the private sector. If the multiplier is not too 
large, the private sector equates the present value of the after tax cash flows on the marginal dollar invested 
to 1. This achieves the first best when the tax rate is the same across periods and set at 
1
1
m
t


. So long 
as 1m  , the first-best tax rate t>0 and some government spending is efficient in the first-best outcome.  
27 
 
ex-post distortions entailed in repaying such spending make lenders distrust it. The ex-
post distortions may, however, be smaller than the ex-ante benefit, in which case short 
horizons may be beneficial.   
Finally, to the extent that democratic governments have shorter horizons than 
more authoritarian governments, a switch from democracy to autocracy reduces a 
country’s debt capacity and increases the risk associated with its outstanding debt. In 
other words, political risk associated with an increase in authoritarianism could be very 
detrimental to debt values.     
 
IV. Endogenous choice of financial sophistication 
Thus far, we have taken the deadweight cost of defaulting on domestically held 
government debt, z, as given. Governments do have some freedom in choosing z, for 
instance, pushing it higher by encouraging a repo market in government assets.  
A good example of creating a class of debt that is so entangled with the financial 
sector’s transactions that it is hard to default on is the “special” status accorded to the 
debt of government-sponsored enterprises (GSE), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in the 
United States. A significant portion of the GSE debt is held by the financial sector and by 
foreign governments who trade it freely in a highly liquid and sophisticated market – the 
so-called “agency debt” market. Agency debt serves the role of collateral for open-market 
operations (OMO) with the Federal Reserve – equivalent to the role played by Treasuries, 
so that any default would disrupt the transactional services associated with this debt.
16
  
                                                 
16 Further, default on GSE debt would not only impose collateral damage on the domestic financial sector, 
but also raise concerns about implications for repayment on Treasury debt: “They (foreign governments) 
wanted to know if the U.S. would stand behind the implicit guarantee – and what this would imply for other 
U.S. obligations, such as Treasury bonds.” – Henry Paulson, the United States Treasury Secretary during 
Fall 2008, in his account of the crisis, On the Brink, Business Plus, 2010. 
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Market participants could have reasonably concluded that the special treatment accorded 
GSE debt as OMO collateral and the associated centrality of the agency debt market 
indicated that the United States government would stand behind this debt in the final 
eventuality. This implicit guarantee, in turn, enabled the GSEs to borrow substantially 
despite being privately held enterprises. The implicit guarantee was indeed honored by 
the government when GSEs were placed in government “conservatorship” in September 
2008, without debt holders suffering any losses.
17
 
Once z becomes a choice variable, willingness to pay is no longer a constraint on 
borrowing. However, with no uncertainty, governments cannot set a debt level at which 
they would default, for creditors would not agree to lend.  Of course, so long as the 
government does not default at date 2, the cost of default stemming from z is never 
incurred. To make the choice of z at date 0 interesting, we extend the model to allow for 
uncertainty in date-2 output.   
 Specifically, suppose that with probability q , second-period output will be high 
at 2 1( ) 0
Hf k  , and otherwise low at 2 1 1( ) 0,
Lf k k  .  Hence, the private sector’s problem 
can be restated as 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 12
1 1
max (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ,
(1 ) (1 )
H
k t f k t qf k k
r r
   
 
and its optimized 
investment level *1k is given by the modified first-order condition 
1 1 1 2 2 12
1 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 1 0.
(1 ) (1 )
Ht f k t qf k
r r
     
 
 
Now, whenever debt is to be repaid in the second period, the country will default 
in the low state and incur the default costs from disruption of the domestic financial 
                                                 
17 See Acharya, Nieuwerburgh, Richardson and White (2011), Chapter 4, for a detailed discussion. 
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sector.  Denoting the face value of newly issued debt as 1D  (so that its market value 
is 1qD ), the government’s problem is  
     
1 1, , 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
max (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )Dom Ht z D qD D r qD r q zD r t f k t qt f k t          
 
  (20) 
subject to the constraints              
 
 1 2 2 1(1 ) min[ , (1 )]
H DomD r t f zD r    (21) 
and 
      
 1 0 1 1[ ( )].
DomD E k t   (22) 
 
Since there is no reason to set the deadweight losses higher than what is needed to 
enforce maximum debt repayment, 1 1
DomD zD . Substituting in the objective function, it 
is clear it is increasing in 1
DomzD iff 
1
q
r
 

.  This then means setting z such that 
2 2
1 1
1
H
Dom t fD zD
r
 

. 
Substituting for 1 1,
DomzD D in the objective function, differentiating w.r.t. 1t and 
collecting terms, we obtain the first-order condition with respect to 1t as  
*
1
2 2 1 1 1
1
(1 ) 0
1
H dkq q t f t f f
r dt

            
. Using the envelope theorem, and knowing 
that 2 21
1
Ht f
D
r


, *1 0 1 1( )
DomD E k t    , and 
* 2 2
*
0 1 1(1 )[ ( )]
Ht f
z
r E k t

 
, we can show 
Proposition 4: (i) 
*
1 0
dt
d
 , 1 0
dD
d
 ,
*
0
dz
d
 . 
 (ii) 
*
1 0
dt
dq
 , 1 0
dD
dq
 ,
*
0
dz
dq
 . 
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Interestingly, with z endogenous, the optimal date-1 tax increases as the 
government’s horizon increases. This is because the expected cost to the government at 
date 2 – in terms of debt repayments and deadweight costs of default – exceeds the 
resources obtained from taxation at that date. Therefore, the higher the discount factor of 
the government,  , the less it wants to borrow. Because the only limit on borrowing is 
date-2 production, the government lowers date-2 production by raising the tax rate. It also 
reduces z to match the lower value of debt payment that has to be committed to.  
Conversely, the higher is q , the lower the probability the deadweight costs of 
default will be incurred, the higher the benefit to borrowing, and hence the lower the 
optimal date-1 tax so as to expand investment, date-2 production, and hence borrowing 
capacity.
18
 Similarly, the higher is q , higher is z to ensure that the higher promised debt 
payment will be made. 
More generally, the horizons of the government and the uncertainty affecting 
output both affect optimal debt and taxes. The more the government is myopic, the more 
it ignores the deadweight costs of default in the low state, and the higher the amount it 
wants to borrow. This implies lower taxes (to create future debt payment ability) and 
higher entanglement between the government and the financial sector so as to increase 
the future deadweight costs of default z. Less uncertainty again makes debt more 
attractive, and thus entails lower taxes today, and higher sophistication/entanglement. 
V. Implications 
The ongoing sovereign crisis in Europe raises some fundamental issues that our 
model can speak to. For instance, our model explains why some governments keep 
                                                 
18 Note that q also has the direct effect of making private sector’s investment more attractive, all else equal, 
which also expands date-2 production and therefore the borrowing capacity. 
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current on their debt, even when most market participants suggest it would be better for 
them to default. So long as the Euro area and multilateral institutions are willing to 
provide funding to tide the country over, myopic governments really see no benefit in 
default, no matter how much debt accumulates. That does not, however, mean that 
servicing debt or taking actions that maintain or expand long term debt capacity (such as 
creating greater entanglements between domestic banks and domestic government debt) 
are optimal.    
In this regard, the role of multilateral lending institutions has to be examined very 
carefully. Ostensibly, they lend to a country when private markets seize up, thus 
preventing the country from undergoing a wrenching real adjustment. The intent is that 
once private markets view the country more favorably – after real sector reforms shaped 
by conditions set by the multilateral institutions – the country will regain access to the 
private markets and repay its debt. Our model suggests that for developing countries, the 
key concern for the private markets is the time profile of the country’s debt service 
burden and fears that the country will be required to make net debt repayments for a 
while that its myopic government will not honor. This means that left to its own devices, 
the country will not be able to regain access until its debt is rescheduled – though 
sometimes a minor rescheduling (see later) will be enough.  
Multilateral lending institutions like the IMF can help sometimes, not just because 
they hold the carrot of additional loans, but because they can press the developing 
country government to cut unnecessary spending that will help put the country back on a 
sustainable (i.e., net positive debt inflows) debt path. Of course, IMF conditionality is 
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onerous for governments, but they often fall behind program targets, reducing the 
effective cost.  
For rich countries, though, the direct cost of default is substantial, and default 
looms only when the country simply does not have the political and economic ability to 
raise the revenues needed to repay debt – as, for example, in the case of Greece. When 
rich countries are in danger of default, outside agencies that lend them more without 
helping these countries expand productivity and growth are only postponing the 
inevitable messy restructuring. Rich country defaults are more likely to be solvency 
defaults rather than liquidity defaults, and a simple rescheduling of debt without 
significant haircuts to face value is unlikely to help the country regain access to private 
markets.  
Another interesting development in the on-going sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
is the extreme degree of dependence of the health of a country’s banking sector on the 
health of the government, and vice versa. Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2010) 
document that the 91 European banks stress-tested in 2010 held sovereign bonds on 
average up to a sixth of their risk-weighted assets, and that within these sovereign bond 
holdings, there is a “home bias” in that banks held substantial portion in own government 
bonds. Indeed, the home bias in sovereign bond holdings was the highest for countries 
with the greatest risk of government debt default,
19
 suggesting they are positively 
correlated; Countries that are at greater risk of default also have banks whose portfolios 
are stuffed with own government debt.  
                                                 
19 In particular, in the stress test data released by European regulators in April 2010, banks of Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy held on average more than sixty percent of their government bonds in 
own government bonds. 
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 One explanation is that banks are buyers of last resort (perhaps with some arm-
twisting) for their government’s debt, and this is why risky countries, who find no other 
takers, stuff their banks with their paper. An alternative explanation (see Diamond and 
Rajan (2011)) is that banks have a natural advantage in loading up on risks that will 
materialize when they themselves are likely to be in default. But a third, not mutually 
exclusive, explanation is ours -- that countries have to prove to new bondholders their 
enduring resolve to service their foreign debt, and this is best done by making the costs of 
default on domestic debt prohibitively costly.  
 In this vein, consider the recent proposal of the Euro area think tank, Bruegel, for 
Euro area sovereigns to issue two kinds of debt, one (blue bond) that is guaranteed by all 
Euro area countries and will be held by domestic banks, and another (red bond) that is the 
responsibility of the issuing country only and which domestic banks will be prohibited 
from holding. Our model points out that there is very little reason for a country to service 
the red bonds. These will not be held by key domestic financial institutions, and therefore 
will not cause many ripples if they are defaulted on. This will make it hard for a country 
to borrow sizeable amounts through red bond issuances, which may indeed be the subtle 
intent of the proposal.     
Let us now turn to other implications of our model. In our model, the costs of 
default are sizeable only when the country becomes rich (when it rarely defaults), but the 
costs of default (as well as the benefits) when it is developing are small. This may explain 
some curious aspects of defaults that are less easily explained by models that have high 
default costs no matter what the country’s state of development. Specifically, in models 
where large penalties are triggered by default, the extent of the default typically should 
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not matter (again see, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)). If so, the country might 
as well repudiate all its debt following the maxim “in for a penny, in for a pound”. Yet 
countries rarely do this.
20
 At the same time, the existence of sizeable discrete default 
costs would imply that developing countries should not default only to reduce their debt a 
little – but debt renegotiations have ended with debtors agreeing to repay nearly 90 
percent of present value of the outstanding debt (see the case of Uruguay’s 2003 
exchange described in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005)).  
Instead, the primary objective in debt renegotiations seems to be to find a 
mutually acceptable deal that will allow the country to regain access to the debt markets. 
In our model, following a default, a relatively small haircut in the face value of existing 
debt (or a rescheduling of maturities) could make the sequence of cash inflows from the 
external debt markets positive for each successive government until the country becomes 
rich and has a sizeable cost of default. The small haircut to existing debt would therefore 
be enough to make the debt sustainable. A greater haircut on the debt is not something 
the myopic government renegotiating a past default needs, nor is it likely to want to 
prolong its own exclusion from external capital markets in search of it, no matter what 
the future benefit to the country. Given the purpose of renegotiation is to regain debt 
market access with positive net inflows, the loss of market access can indeed be 
temporary, and debt haircuts very moderate.
21
    
Our model also suggests a possible explanation for why external debt becomes 
shorter and shorter maturity as a country’s economic difficulties mount. Clearly, lenders 
                                                 
20 One could, of course, argue that the less that is repaid, the worse the type the country reveals itself to be. 
21 Tough negotiators, like the Argentinian government in the 2003-2005 debt negotiations, which till date 
of writing had yet to clear its arrears, are likely to be the exception, probably because their horizons are 
longer or because there is domestic political gain (that we do not model) to forcing large haircuts on 
unpopular foreign debt holders. 
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want the ability to refuse to roll over their money if they see fundamental conditions 
deteriorating. But the key condition they could be monitoring is not the underlying 
country fundamentals but whether others are continuing to lend, giving the country an 
incentive to service debt – country liquidity and  continuing debt service could be closely 
tied. So long as inflows are positive, the country will continue to service debt, and short-
term lending can be quite lucrative. The key is to stop lending before others are 
anticipated to stop, which is why a country’s access can become quite fragile, and prone 
to multiple equilibria, as its fundamentals deteriorate and maturities shorten. “Sudden 
stops” in lending, and subsequent country default, are the natural consequence (though 
their full modeling is beyond the scope of our model).   
VI. Related literature 
There is a vast literature on sovereign debt that we do not have the space to do 
justice to (see Eaton and Fernandez (1995) or Tomsz (2007) for excellent discussions). 
Our work is most closely related to the recent literature explaining why countries repay 
because of the costs to the domestic financial sector of sovereign defaults. Our 
contribution to this literature is to explain why developing countries service debt even 
though the costs of default to them are small. Government myopia plays a key role in the 
explanation, as well as in determining fiscal policy and debt capacity.  
Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010) assume the costs of default on domestic bond 
holders and argue that the ability of foreigners who hold domestic bonds to sell out 
surreptitiously to domestic entities in the secondary debt markets ensures that the 
government will never be able to default selectively on foreigners. Thus the costs of 
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defaulting on domestically held bonds, combined with liquid and anonymous secondary 
markets, ensures the sustainability of foreign borrowing.  
Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2011) build a model in which banks demand 
government bonds as a store of liquidity. This then allows banks to expand 
intermediation, investment, and output of the economy.  Governments can increase 
domestic wealth by defaulting on external creditors, but the disruption of the domestic 
financial sector reduces this incentive.  Thus, financial development in their setup, which 
boosts the leverage of banks, increases the government’s cost of default.  They also 
provide empirical support for the implications of the model concerning the 
complementarity of public and private borrowing in good times, and the severe 
disruptions to credit and output following sovereign defaults in countries with financially 
developed markets.   
Bolton and Jeanne (2011) consider a setting in which governments want to 
maintain their credit quality so as to keep the inter-bank market working – government 
bonds serve a useful collateral role, and banks wish to hold government bonds of 
different countries for diversification reasons.  While these forces allow the possibility 
for governments to borrow ex ante, the financial integration across countries leads ex post 
to contagion.  Since the costs of contagion are not fully internalized by governments of 
weaker countries, there may be an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt.  
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2010) consider the incentives of a long-horizon 
government to default on legacy debt when faced with the prospect of bailing out its 
distressed financial sector.  Being long-horizon, their government internalizes the under-
investment induced in the private sector by excessive sovereign borrowing (and future 
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taxation), a force that pushes it in the direction of default on legacy debt.  However, the 
government is deterred by the potential collateral damage from sovereign default to the 
financial sector due to its government bond holdings and implicit guarantees.
22
 Finally, while we have argued that our paper offers an alternative lens to 
reputational models such as Tomsz (2007) through which to see sovereign debt, the two 
are not mutually exclusive. While we emphasize the short term outlook of governments 
and reputational models emphasize the reputational concerns of far-sighted governments, 
in reality most governments contain both short-term focused ministers as well as 
politicians who look to the long term. Whose influence is maximal, and when, will 
determine the kinds of behavior that one might see. More work is needed to nest the 
models and derive more detailed implications.      
    VII. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we develop a model where myopic governments seek electoral 
popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not 
default when they are poor because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced 
to reduce spending; they do not default when they become rich because of the adverse 
consequences to the domestic financial sector. Interestingly, the more myopic a 
government, the greater the advantage it sees in borrowing, and therefore the less likely it 
will be to default (in contrast to models where sovereigns repay because they are 
concerned about their long term reputation).  More myopic governments are also likely to 
                                                 
22 Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2010) also employ data on credit default swaps (CDS) on banks and 
sovereigns during the period 2007-2010 and show evidence of what they call “the two-way feedback”: 
While bailouts transferred risks from the financial sector to sovereign balance-sheets in the Fall of 2008, 
the steady deterioration of sovereign health since then has in turn contributed to widening of bank CDS. 
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tax in a more distortionary way, and create more dependencies between the domestic 
financial sector and government debt that raise the costs of default. We use the model to 
explain recent experiences in sovereign debt markets.  
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Lemma 1: Consider condition (7).  Consider the difference between left hand and right 
hand sides given by * *2 2 1 1 0 1 1
1
( ( )) ( ( )).
(1 )
t f k t z E k t
r
 

 Since '2 0f  and 
*
1
1
0
dk
dt
 , it 
follows that this difference is a decreasing function of 1t .  Thus, (assuming interior 
solutions) there exists a threshold tax rate 
1t above which ability-to-pay constraint applies 
and below which willingness-to-pay constraint applies, and the threshold is given by the 
condition 
 * *2 2 1 1 0 1 1
1
( ( )) ( ( )) 0.
(1 )
t f k t z E k t
r
  

 (23) 
Differentiating this condition with respect to 0E and simplifying yields 
 
*
' * 1 1
2 2 1 1
1 0
1
( ( )) .
(1 )
dk dt
t f k t z z
r dt dE
 
  
 
 (24) 
Since '2 0f  and 
*
1
1
0
dk
dt
 , it follows that  1
0
dt
dE
< 0.  
Similarly, differentiating condition (23) with respect to z and simplifying yields 
 
*
' * *1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 0
1
1
( ( )) ( ) .
(1 )
dk dt
t f k t z k t E
r dt dz
 
   
 
 (25) 
41 
 
Since *
1 1 0( )k t E (investment is bounded above by economy’s endowment), it follows 
that 1
dt
dz
< 0.  Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2: Note that the optimal interior tax-rate 1
At in the ability-to-pay region satisfies 
equation (9) which is independent of 0E and z. The rest of the lemma follows from the 
properties of 1t derived in Lemma 1. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3: Recall that 1
At is given by the first-order condition (9) and 1
Wt is given by the 
first-order condition (11). Since second-order condition is assumed to be met for both 
problems (see footnotes 9 and 10), and because
*
1
1
0
dk
dt
 , it follows that 1
Wt > 1
At . The 
properties of 1
Wt in endowment 0E and default cost z follow similarly to proof in Lemma 1 
by taking derivatives of equation (11) with respect to 0E and z, respectively. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2: From Lemma 1, ability-to-pay constraint 
applies if tax rate is above 1t  and willingness-to-pay constraint applies otherwise.  
Further, from Lemma 3, 1
Wt > 1
At . Hence, the three cases to consider are: (i) 1 1 1
W At t t  ; 
(ii) 1 1 1
W At t t  ; and, (iii) 1 1 1
W At t t  .  
Under case (i), the feasible region is the ability-to-pay region, so that tax rate is set at the 
optimal interior tax rate 1
At which from Lemma 2 is independent of 0E and z.  
Under case (ii), the feasible region is just the threshold point 1t , which from Lemma 1 is 
decreasing in 0E and z. 
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Under case (iii), the feasible region is the willingness-to-pay region, so that tax rate is set 
at the optimal interior tax rate 1
Wt which from Lemma 3 is independent of 0E but 
increasing in z. 
Whether the equilibrium is in regions (i), (ii) or (iii) is determined by levels of parameters 
0E and z. Consider first the effect of varying 0E . As 0E is raised, the optimal interior tax 
rates 1
Wt and 1
At corresponding to the willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay regions, 
respectively, are unaffected, whereas the threshold rate 
1t declines.  It follows then that 
there exists threshold levels of 0E (say 0E and 0E ) above and below which respectively 
case (i) and (iii) apply.  Under case (i), the tax rate is 1
At , which is independent of 0E ; 
under case (iii), 1
Wt which from Lemma 3 is independent of 0E ; and in between the 
thresholds, the tax rate is 
1t , which from Lemma 1 is decreasing in 0E .  
Consider next the effect of varying z. As z is raised, 1
At is unaffected, 1t declines, whereas 
1
Wt rises.  It follows then that there exists threshold levels of z (say z and z ) above and 
below which respectively case (i) and (iii) apply.  Under case (i), the tax rate is 1
At , which 
is independent of z ;  under case (iii), the tax rate is 1
Wt which from Lemma 3 is increasing 
in z ; and in between the thresholds, the tax rate is 1t , which is decreasing in z .   
Finally, consider the debt capacity  * * * * *1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1
1
min ( ( )), ( )
(1 )
D t f k t z E k t
r
 
  
 
. As 
explained above, in the ability-to-pay region (first term inside square brackets), the tax 
rate *1t is set to 1
At which is independent of 0E  (Lemma 2).   Then, since 
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* * *
' * *1 1 1
2 2 1 1
0 1 0
1
( ( ))
(1 )
dD dk dt
t f k t
dE r dt dE


, in this region we have 
*
1
0
0
dD
dE
 . Similarly, we obtain 
that 
*
1 0
dD
dz
 in this region. 
In contrast, in the willingness-to-pay region (second term inside square brackets), the tax 
rate *1t is set to 1
Wt . In this case, 
* * *
1 1 1
*
0 1 0
1
dD dk dt
z
dE dt dE
 
  
 
> 0 since 
*
1
*
1
0
dk
dt
 and
*
1
0
dt
dE
= 0 for 
*
1t = 1
Wt (Lemma 3). Similarly,  
* * *
* *1 1 1
0 1 1 *
1
( )
dD dk dt
E k t z
dz dt dz
   > 0 since 
*
1
*
1
0
dk
dt
 and
*
1dt
dz
> 0 
for *1t = 1
Wt (Lemma 3). 
In the intermediate region, the tax rate is set to 
1t .  Now, since
'
2 0f  , 
*
1
*
1
0
dk
dt
 and 
*
1
0
0
dt
dE
  (Lemmas 1), it follows that
*
1
0
0
dD
dE
 . Similarly, it can be shown that
*
1 0
dD
dz
 in 
this region.  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2: From equation (15), the threshold level of legacy debt 0
MaxD  above which 
the short-horizon government defaults is given by 
** * ** * * * *
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1( ( )) (1 ) ( ( )).
Maxt f k t D D r t f k t     The no-default case debt capacity is 
 * * * * *1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1
1
min ( ( )), ( )
(1 )
D t f k t z E k t
r
 
  
 
where the no-default case tax rate *1t is as 
characterized in Proposition 1.  The default-case tax rate **1t is given by condition (14).  
Then, it follows that 
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 * ** * ** * * *0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0
(1 ) ( ( )) ( ( )) .
MaxdD d
r D t f k t t f k t
dE dE
       (26) 
From (14), 
**
1
0
0.
dt
dE
  And, * * * * * * * *1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0
( ( )) ( ( ))
d
D t f k t D t f k t
dE E

        
by envelope 
theorem as *1t is chosen by the short-horizon government to maximize
* * * *
1 1 1 1 1( ( ))D t f k t . 
Since * * * *1 1 1 1 1
0
( ( ))D t f k t
E

  
=
*
1
0
0
D
E



, it follows that 0
0
0.
MaxdD
dE
  Similar arguments 
show that 0 0.
MaxdD
dz
  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3:  Differentiating equation (19) w.r.t.   when 
1
(1 )r
 

(the other case 
being discussed in text),  
 * **
1 1
* * **
*0 1 1 1
1
1 1
1
(1 (1 )) (1 ) .
(1 )
Max
t t
dD dD dt dtdG dG
r D r
d r d dt d dt d

   
 
       
  
 (27) 
As explained in the text, in the ability-to-pay region, 2 21
1
t f
D
r


and , 0 , 01 1
A At t   . Hence, 
in this region, 
*
1dD
d
= 0 and 
*
1dt
d
= 0.  By definition of **1t , 
1
dG
dt
= 0 at **1t . It follows then 
that in the ability-to-pay region, 0
MaxdD
d
= *1D < 0.  The same arguments apply for the 
case when both constraints bind as 0 01 1t t
   .   
In contrast, in the willingness-to-pay region, we obtain by applying envelope theorem to 
the first-order condition (17) that 
 
*
'1 1
2 2
1
( ). (1 ) 0,
Wdt dk
soc z r t f
d dt
       (28) 
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where (soc) is the second-order condition, assumed to be negative. Then, since '2f > 0 and 
*
1
1
dk
dt
< 0, it follows that  1
Wdt
d
< 0.  Further, in this region, 
* *
1 1 1
1
0.
W
W
dD dk dt
z
d dt d 
     Finally, 
substituting the first-order condition (17) into *
1
1
t
dG
dt
, we obtain that *
1
1
t
dG
dt
equals 
*
1
1
[1 (1 )] .
dk
r z
dt
   Then, substituting the various pieces in (28) and simplifying, we 
obtain that *0 0 1 1( ) 0.
Max
WdD z E k t
d
       Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4:   Note that the optimal tax rate *1t is given by the condition (foc) 
*
1
2 2 1 1 1
1
(1 ) 0
1
H dkq q t f t f f
r dt

            
. The corresponding second-order condition 
(soc) is assumed to be negative.  Then, differentiating the (foc) w.r.t.  , it follows that 
*
1dt
d
has the same sign as 
*
' 1
2 2
1
( )
(1 ) 0H
dkfoc
q t f
dt

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
since 
*
1
1
0.
dk
dt
  Then, 
* * *
'1 2 1 1
2 *
1
0
(1 )
HdD t dk dtf
d r dt d 
 

and 
*dz
d
  
* *
* '2 1 1
0 1 2 22 **
10 1
0.
(1 )
H Ht dk dtE k f f
dt dr E k 
      
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Similarly, 
*
1dt
dq
has the same sign as 
*
' 1
2 2
1
( ) 1
0.
(1 )
H dkfoc t f
q r dt

 
   
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 Further, since 
the (foc) for private sector’s choice of *1k  is given by 
1 1 1 2 2 12
1 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 1 0,
(1 ) (1 )
Ht f k t qf k
r r
     
 
differentiation of (foc) w.r.t. q and 
46 
 
assuming (soc) < 0, yields that 
*
1k
q


> 0. Then,
* * * *
'1 2 1 1 1
2 *
1
0
(1 )
HdD t k dk dtf
dq r q dt dq
 
   
  
and 
* * **
* '2 1 1 1
0 1 2 22 **
10 1
0.
(1 )
H Ht k dk dtdz E k f f
dq q dt dqr E k
 
               
 Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B: Example  
Under the choice of functional forms 1 2( ) , ( ) (1 ) ,f k k f k k
      we obtain the 
following solutions for analysis of Section II, which are employed in generation of 
Figures 2-7: 
1
(1 )
* 2
1 1 1
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( ) (1 ) .
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t
k t t
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1t is given implicitly (as it affects 
*k ) by the condition 
*
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1
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1 ( )
Wt  is given by the condition 
  21 2 1
(1 )(1 )1
(1 ) (1 ) . (1 ) .
(1 ) (1 )
t
t t z t
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
       
     
           
     
 
Then, *1t and 
*
1D are given respectively as  
*
1 1
At t if 1 1 1
W At t t  ; 1t if 1 1 1
W At t t  ; and 1
Wt otherwise, and 
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 * * * * *1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1
1
min ( ( )), ( ) .
(1 )
D t f k t z E k t
r
 
  
 
 
Once in default, the tax policy **1 ( )t  is given by the condition 
  21 2 1
(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) .
(1 )
t
t t t
r

     
  
      
 
 
In turn, the threshold level of legacy debt above which the government defaults is given 
by  
* * **
0 1 1 1
1
(1 (1 )) ( ) ( )
(1 )
MaxD D r G t G t
r
      
, where 
   *1 1 2 1( ) (1 ) ( ) .G t t t k t     
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Figure 2: Short-horizon government’s tax policy (rate) as a function of endowment 
 
Figure 3: Short-horizon government’s debt capacity as a function of endowment 
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Figure 4: Short-horizon government’s tax policy (rate) as a function of productivity  
 
Figure 5: Short-horizon government’s debt capacity as a function of productivity  
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 Figure 6a: Government’s tax policy as a function of myopia for varying endowment 
 
Figure 6b: Government’s debt capacity as a function of myopia for varying endowment  
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Figure 7a: Government’s tax policy as a function of myopia for varying productivity 
 
Figure 7b: Government’s debt capacity as a function of myopia for varying productivity 
 
